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V. Suggestions for Reforming the Current Labour Dispute 
Settlement System 
 
Functioning of a system relies on its organisations, and rational system must be based 
on rational organisational arrangement. Organisations, handling labour disputes, involve 
mediation organisations, arbitration organisations and People’s Courts. Establishing 
rational organisational structure in conformity with socialist market economy is a 
practical and also theoretical issue. Reform of labour dispute handling organisation 
should be based on experience in countries of developed market economy, particularly 
in European countries and USA, and Chinese real situation. The reform must be carried 
out in whole system and in all the organisations, handling labour disputes, namely, 
mediation organisations, arbitration organisations and judicial organisations.  
 
1. Suggestions for Reforming Mediation System 
 
Enterprise Labour Dispute Mediation Committees should be turned from internal 
organisations into social organisations. As the labour dispute mediation system was 
restored in mid-1980s along with labour system reform, which started from state-run 
enterprises, the system consequently targeted at state-run enterprises. The name of 
Provisional Regulations on Labour Dispute Settlment in State-run Enterprises is a 
perfect illustration of the situation. In 1990s, when theProvisional Regulations was 
replaced by Regulations on Settlement of Labour Disputes in Enterprises, the system 
extended its coverage to all enterprises, but not all employing units as stipulated by 
Labour Law. It is a well-known fact that enterprise trade unions play an important role 
in mediation of labour disputes within enterprise. Enterprise trade union is integrated 
with the secretariat for Labour Dispute Mediation Committee, and its power 
consequently has been strengthened. Trade union often exceeds its duties and replace 
tripatism coordination or directly act as intermediator. According to article 8 of Rule on 
Organisational Structure and Working Procedure of Municipal Labour Dispute 
Arbitration Committee,” the mediation committee is composed of representative(s) of 
employee(s), representative(s) of the enterprise and representative(s) of the enterprise 
trade union…” and “The number of enterprise representative(s) shall not exceed one 
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third of the total.” However, as the members of trade union are also the enterprise’s 
employees, they can not be free of the enterprise’s influence in expressing their opinions. 
In spite of the relative independence of trade union, it still relies on enterprise to finance 
their administrative and other costs. In this regard, trade union can not hold a 
neutralised position in mediating disputes. In enterprise of any type of ownership, such 
committee can not perform its function in an proper manner, at least not more than 
“blurring the line between right and wrong”. Generally, a mediation body within 
enterprise is likely to be controlled by enterprise. Therefore, it is international 
convention to set up mediation bodies in administrative or sub-administrative organs so 
that they can independently exercise public power to mediate disputes, and parties to a 
dispute are given free choice of mediation or other form of settlement on voluntary 
basis.  
Mediation bodies in administrative or sub-administrative organs will be not held 
by enterprise “by elbow” and thus able to discharge their duties of mediating disputes in 
a proper manner. In addition, in market economy mediation bodies should not constrain 
themselves within mediating disputes in enterprises, they should also handle disputes in 
other organisations. Inline with tripartism principle, the parties to labour relations 
should participate in the mediation through their representatives. Administrative organs 
should also involve in the process. So, mediation bodies must be established on 
independent basis. It is most desirable to set up mediation bodies with small secretariat 
and large team of arbitrators.  
For the French model for labour dispute settlement, individual mediation 
committees focus on settling individual labour disputes, while collective labour disputes 
are resolved through arbitration. Individual mediation committees involve division of 
mediation and division of ruling. Since Chinese labour dispute mediation committees 
are originated from individual labour disputes in enterprises and organised in line with 
tripartism principle, it is more practicable to make them independent from enterprise 
and relatively independent from administrative organs. Of course, such mediation 
committees should be put under guidance of administrative organs.  
It is also necessary to carry out reform on the mediation procedure. Amendments 
have to be made in the present mediation procedure in order to remedy the shortcomings 
and improve the procedure.  
 40
Firstly, it is of great significance to enhance the flexibility of labour dispute 
mediation procedure. Rather than being as rigid procedure as arbitration and litigation 
procedure, the mediation procedure should be flexible and reflects wills of the parties. 
Excessively detailed stipulations on the procedure will hinder taking full advantages of 
mediation and effective protection of parties’ rights. Currently, the time limit for 
applying for arbitration is 60 days after the occurrence of a dispute, and the time limit 
may be expired, since the mediation procedure lacks flexibility and may take long time. 
What is more, parties, particularly employees, may lose time, as they are not familiar 
with labour dispute settlement procedures. Therefore, the mediation procedure should 
be flexible, without being confined by formalities. The procedure can be simplified, as 
soon as it contributes to the reaching of agreement based on true wills f the parties.   
Secondly, the reform should grant the binding force to mediation agreements. 
Lack of binding force has not only weakened the mediation system, also brought about 
the prevalent point of view that the mediation is a nominal and void process. On 
September 5, 2002, the Suppertime People’s Court made interpretation on the effect of 
People’s mediation agreements, and according to the interpretation, a agreement shall 
possess legal biding force, if it is made by legal procedure and consensus of the parties, 
in confirmation of laws and regulations, not at loss of other’s interests. The 
interpretation can be used for reference in the case of labour dispute mediation. In our 
opinion, it is inevitable trend to grant mediation agreements conditional legal biding 
force. As regulations issued by the State Council, Regulations on Settlement of Labour 
Disputes in Enterprises specify the mediation procedure in details and make it a legal 
procedure. Therefore, conditional legal binding force will avoid void mediation 
agreements, and save time of workloads of parties and mediation committees. Of course, 
there should be some pre-conditions for the agreements to come into legal effect, such 
as legal procedure, reflection of true wills of the parties and conformity with state and 
public interests. If all the conditions are met, neither arbitration nor litigation should be 
accepted.   
Thirdly, there is need to revoke some components of the mediation procedure, 
which are not in line with the nature and spirits of mediation. According to article 19 of 
Rule on Organisational Structure and Working Procedure of Enterprise Labour Dispute 
Mediation Committee, “Any party has right to request, in writing or orally, for 
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withdrawal of any member of arbitration committee, if:1) if he is one of the parties, or a 
close relative of a party to the dispute; or 2) if he has a personal stake in the labour 
dispute; or 3) if he has some other relations with a party to the labour dispute that might 
affect the impartial handling of the case. The arbitration committee shall make a prompt 
decision on a request of withdrawal, and notify the parties orally or in writing. Decision 
of withdrawal of committee members shall be made by chair of the arbitration 
committee, and withdrawal of chair shall be decided collectively by the members of the 
committee.“ Such stipulation may cause misunderstanding that the mediation committee 
exercises public power and is organisation of public remedy. This is against the nature 
of mediation, as labour dispute mediation is defined as non-official mediation, the 
mediation committee, even after reform, will not turn into organisation of public power, 
and the mediation procedure will not turn into public remedy. Non-official nature of the 
mediation determines that the committee can not impose its will on the parties. For this 
reason, there is no need to set up withdrawal system at all. There is logic mistake in the 
stipulation on mediation procedure, since it is the parties that reach agreement on their 
own wills, and committee only provides assistance, not imposing its decision on the 
parties. Therefore, it is necessary to remove such components, which go against nature 
and spirits of mediation.  
 
2. Suggestions for Reforming Arbitration System      
 
The functioning of labour dispute arbitration system is based on rational arbitration 
organisations. An arbitration organisation in line with demands of market economy 
involves three factors: tripartism principle, independence from labour administrative 
department and perfect arbitrator system.  
Firstly, it is essential to form arbitration organisations based on “real 
representation” of the three parties. Created under planned economy, China’s arbitration 
committees have not reflected real interests of the three parties. Currently, there is crisis 
in recognising identities of the representatives. Labour administrative departments, on 
behalf of administrative authorities, engage in harmonising labour relations and ensure 
economic construction and social stability. There is no problem on its represantation. In 
the case of trade union representative(s), they are experiencing identity crisis. Trade 
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union representatives in the arbitration committee come from local trade union 
association, neither enterprise trade union representatives nor representatives elected by 
Employees’ Congress. This, to a certain degree, affects their representation of 
employees’ interests. Since the restoration of arbitration system in 1980s, which then 
targeted at state-run enterprises, enterprises had been represented by SETC, namely 
State Economic and Trade Commission (State Economic Commission formerly), and its 
local departments. However, after China’s transition from planned economy to market 
economy, the coverage of labour dispute settlement system was widened to all 
enterprises. Accordingly, it became improper for SETC and its local departments to 
represent enterprises, especially foreign funded and private enterprises. At present, 
China Enterprise Confederation and its local branches China Enterprise Associations 
have replaced SETC and its local departments to represent enterprises in settling labour 
disputes. In fact, according to the tripartism principle, representation of enterprise 
administration departments in arbitration committee should be considered as employers’ 
or enterprises’ representation, not representation of the government. When autonomy of 
enterprises has still not been set up and team of real entrepreneurs has not been formed, 
interests of enterprises are expressed by various administrative departments, especially 
enterprise administrative departments. 7   
In this regard, it is a necessary and urgent task to form real tripartism mechanism, 
which will represent interests of the three parties and correspond with demands of 
market economy. In our opinion, in order to be able to effectively participate in 
arbitration, employees’ representatives should be selected from enterprise trade union or 
industrial trade union, and also meet statutory qualification requirements. Enterprise 
representatives should be selected through negotiations between China Enterprise 
Confederation or Associations, Industrial and Commercial Associations, Associations 
for Foreign Funded Enterprises and other non-official organisations. Enterprise 
representatives should also meet statutory qualification requirements. 
Secondly, labour dispute arbitration committee should be independent from 
labour administrative department. Secretariat of the committee has been the same as 
labour dispute division of local labour administrative department, only under different 
                                                 
7 Wang Zhenqi, Legislation Recommendations on Labour Dispute Settlement System, China Labour, 
No.2 2001  
 43
“cap”. Lack of distinctions between the two organisations has given rise to the 
intervention of administrative power in arbitration. What is more, some enterprises and 
employees identify labour administrative department with arbitration committee, and 
appeal to labour departments for a settlement. All of these have distorted the real “face” 
of arbitration.  
However, many problems will ensue from detaching arbitration committee from 
labour administrative department. This is particularly in the case of funding. China is a 
developing country with vast population, and many tasks can not be performed due to 
shortage of funds. Attachment of arbitration committee with labour administrative 
department, to a degree, can be attributable to the financial consideration. Independent 
arbitration committee has its own personnel, office, equipment, funds to cover operation 
costs, and etc. All of these should not be covered by government budget. However, 
arbitration fee is collected in a purely nominal amount, and therefore the committee’s 
revenue is far from being adequate to support its operations. In order to change the 
situation, it is necessary to detach the arbitration committee from labour administrative 
department and grant it independence. Only in this way, arbitration committee will be 
free from influence of labour administrative department.  
Thirdly, the arbitrator accreditation system should be reformed. “A few of current 
arbitrators have legal educational background, and there is quick turnover among 
arbitrators, which affect the stability of arbitrator team.”8  
There is urgent need to enhance the professional capacity of arbitrators. In this 
regard, accreditation system should be strengthened, and the selection of arbitrators 
should be integrated into unified national judicial examination system. Only successful 
passer of the examination should be allowed to join the profession.  
Reform on labour dispute arbitration system not only involves arbitration 
organisations, but also arbitration procedure. Procedure reform should disconnect 
arbitration with litigation, prevent the arbitration procedure from emulating judicial 
procedure, and eliminate other irrational elements in the arbitration procedure. 
Substantive fairness should be based on the procedure fairness, viz. rational and 
                                                 
8 Fan Zhanjiang, Survey of Labour Dispute Settlement System, China Labour Publishing House, 
December 1994, page 139 
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scientifically designed procedure. Otherwise, irrational procedure would lead its 
performer to unfair conclusion.  
Firstly, the relations between arbitration and litigation should be changed. 
Currently, parties to a labour dispute have to go through “one arbitration and two 
litigations” in seeking a settlement with legal binding force. “One arbitration and two 
litigations” refers to arbitration, litigation by court of first instance and litigation by 
court of second instance. The parties have to go through the long process, primarily 
because arbitration decision does not have “natural” legal binding force. Time limit and 
wills of the parties are the factors, which affect the effect of arbitration decision. An 
arbitration decision will not obtain legal binding force until the time limit expires and if 
any party does not appeal it to court within 15 days. Within 15 days, any party has right, 
on its own wills, to bring the dispute into litigation proceeding.  
Reform of the relations between arbitration and litigation calls for disconnecting 
arbitration and litigation. Arbitration award should come into force right upon delivery 
and no litigation proceeding will be followed. “Autonomy of wills” should also apply to 
procedure selection, viz. parties should have free choice of arbitration or litigation. 
Arbitration system should be parallel to the litigation system.  
Secondly, it is necessary to restrain arbitration procedure from emulating 
litigation procedure and make it more flexible. The current Regulations, stipulating 
duties of arbitration committee chair and arbitrators in excessive details, has drawn 
attention of the arbitration tribunal to formalities rather than resolution of the dispute. 
Currently, the arbitration procedure is not alterable through agreement of the parties. 
There is also no simplified procedure to deal with simple disputes. It is not a simplified 
procedure, when one arbitrator handles the dispute, because the arbitrator has to abide 
by all the stipulated formalities, without being able to shorten the procedure. Therefore, 
the reform should be aimed at enhancing the flexibility of the arbitration procedure, 
lessening “judging” but intensifying “harmonising”.   
Secondly, voluntary arbitration and compulsory arbitration should be combined. 
Voluntary arbitration refers to the free choice of arbitration by parties to a dispute on 
their own wills. Since the establishment of arbitration system, voluntary arbitration has 
become a trend, particularly in the field of civil and commercial arbitration. So is the 
situation with labour dispute arbitration. Voluntary arbitration has been included in an 
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international convention and accepted by most countries in the world. Voluntary 
arbitration reflects the right of parties for self-determination of procedure, originated 
from right to dispose of substantive rights. Instead of making arbitration a compulsory 
procedure, the parties should be given right to decide whether to resort to arbitration. 
This is particularly in the case of disputes over rights, covered by “autonomy of wills”. 
Aim of the reform is to introduce voluntary arbitration. However, voluntary arbitration 
does not rule out compulsory arbitration. To disputes in certain fields, which affect state 
and public interests, such as collective disputes in enterprises of water supply, 
electricity supply and heating supply, compulsory arbitration should be applied.  
Lastly, irrational elements in the arbitration procedure should be removed. For 
instance, level jurisdiction is currently applied to labour disputes. Precondition of such 
arrangement is existence of arbitration committees of at least two instances, and 
affiliation of lower-level committees to higher-level committees. However, in practice, 
arbitration is conducted only for one time, and the level of an arbitration committee is 
determined by the level of the administrative department, to which it is attached. So 
there is neither administrative affiliation nor supervision between arbitration committees 
at all levels. Up to now, it has never happened that higher-level arbitration committee 
cancelled decisions made by lower-level arbitration committee. Therefore, level 
jurisdiction does not have practical use. The future reform should revoke level 
jurisdiction and grant parties right to determine jurisdiction over their dispute, viz. 
through arbitration agreement. Meanwhile, evidence system and evidence preservation 
system also should be established.  
 
3. Suggestions for Reforming Judicial System and Litigation Procedure 
 
The labour dispute judicial system and litigation procedure should be reformed to 
remove their shortcomings. 
Firstly, the judicial system should be changed. Practice of handling labour 
disputes in countries with developed market economy shows that the judicial system of 
labour disputes settlement, particularly rights disputes, should not be equalised to that of 
civil disputes. Gradual separation of labour law from civil law has also illustrated that 
there are great differences between substantive legal relations regulated by labour law 
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and social relations regulated by civil law. The differences in substantive legal relations 
determine the differences in rights restitution procedures. Accordingly, western 
developed countries have instituted different judicial systems of labour disputes and 
civil disputes. Despite the disparity in judicial systems in those countries, for example, 
the Industrial Tribunal system in the UK and Labour Court system in Germany, there is 
one thing in common that trial system for labour disputes varies from that for civil 
disputes. Since the restoration of labour dispute settlement system in China in 
mid-1980s, the system has been facing dilemma between reality of emulating the civil 
dispute judicial system and need for flexible performance. In practice, there is almost no 
difference in litigation procedures for labour disputes and civil disputes. In spite of the 
fact that the mandatory arbitration prior to litigation has brought to light the 
incompleteness of the judicial system, People’s Courts in practice tolerate such distorted 
system, more or less under interest motivation.   
The reform should be started with judicial system. Experience in foreign 
countries, especially western industrialised countries, can be used for reference. In 
eastern Asian countries, labour disputes are handled by the same procedure as in civil 
dispute judicial procedure. This can be explained by the lagging regulation of industrial 
relations and weak trade unions in those countries. On contrary, western industrialised 
countries have different judicial systems for labour disputes and civil disputes. For 
instance, labour disputes are dealt with by Industrial Tribunals in the UK, Individual 
Labour Conflict Committees in France, and Labour Courts in Germany. The differences 
in judicial systems for labour disputes and civil disputes are determined by the nature of 
labour disputes, as industrial relations are not only property relations but also subjection 
relations between the parties.  
Based on the above-mentioned reasons, it is necessary to adjust the judicial 
system for labour disputes. In mid-1990s, relevant organs attempted to establish labour 
courts in China. In fact, such attempt was made due to lack of knowledge on China’s 
legal system and Chinese reality. It is dangerous to disrupt the integrity of China’s 
judicial system. We should not create specialised court system, merely because of the 
specialties of the social relations, over which disputes take place. The rational way is to 
take into consideration the Chinese reality and the necessity of maintaining integrity of 
China’s judicial system. The specialties of labour disputes should also be taken into 
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account when building judicial system for labour disputes. It is a trend to establish 
judicial tribunals within People’s Courts to deal with labour dispute. In fact, the 
Supreme People’s Court has recognised the specialties in the labour disputes settlement 
procedure in Interpretations on Some Questions on Application of Laws and 
Regulations in Handling Labour Disputes, issued on March 22, 2001. Accordingly, the 
judicial system for labour disputes should reflect the specialties.  
Secondly, the litigation procedure should be adjusted. On March 22, 2001, the 
Supreme People’s Court issued legally binding interpretations on many questions 
concerning labour dispute settlement. Before this, the litigation procedure for labour 
disputes was almost the same as that for civil disputes, apart from different 
requirements for filing a lawsuit and acceptance of a case as well as time limit due to 
mandatory arbitration prior to litigation.  
Interpretations amended the stipulations on requirements for filing a lawsuit over 
a labour dispute and the time limit, weakened the rigid provision of mandatory 
arbitration, and thus opened the door to litigious protection for parties, particularly 
employees, which are in disadvantaged position. Now in certain circumstances People’s 
Court accepts appeal by parties to a dispute without requiring prior arbitration. Besides, 
through there is no specific legal provision, in certain circumstances any party to a 
dispute can bring lawsuit in People’s Court after expiration of the 60-day time limit for 
arbitration.  
Moreover, the Interpretations have made major amendments to the jurisdiction 
system, evidence system and evidence preservation system, and play an important role 
in promoting independence and specialisation of litigation procedure.  
 
Reform of litigation procedure for laboru disputes should include: 
 
• With reference to the practice of western industrialised countries, to 
institute labour dispute litigation procedure, different from that for civil 
disputes, and in line with the specialty of substantive laws, over which 
labour dispute take place.  
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• To set up flexible and simple litigation procedure, shorten the time to be 
spent on litigation and simplify the procedure. Minor labour disputes 
settlement system should be established to promote prompt and cost-saving 
settlement.  
 
• To establish and perfect trade union-based legal aid system, in order to 
provide public assistance to employee, which may in disadvantaged 
position in disputing with enterprises or their counsels.  
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
Entering the new millennium, human beings are confronted with both opportunities and 
challenges. China’ accession into WTO and application of internationally accepted trade 
rules have made it necessary to adjust other rules. Against this background, integration 
of China’ legal system with international conventions is an urgent task.  
In 1980s, despite China was at the climax of conducting economic reform, its 
social-economic life was still dominated by planned economy. Accordingly, the labour 
dispute settlement system, restored then, shows traits of planned economy. This can be 
seen from the name of Provisional Regulations on Labour Dispute Settlement in 
State-run Enterprises, which was issued by the State Council to match Provisional 
Regulations on Labour Contract System in State-run Enterprises, and other 
administrative regulations. Against this background, the labour dispute settlement 
system was oriented toward revitalisation of state-run enterprise and shows obvious 
transitional characteristics.  
Historical background determines a system. In line with the above-mentioned 
setting, labour dispute settlement system, both mediation and arbitration, had narrow 
coverage of state-run enterprises since its restoration. The special features of labour 
relations in state-run enterprises have limited the universality of the system. 
Consequently, a vacuum was left in handling labour disputes in non-state enterprises 
until August 1993. However, the settlement procedures, designed in accordance with 
labour relations in state-run enterprises, may not always be suitable to other enterprises.  
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